Eps 1: The pros and cons of Xi Jinping's Regime
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Dianne Douglas
Podcast Content
An even more troubling facet of Chinas conundrum is that, since Xi became paramount leader in 2012, Chinas Communist Party has returned to the path of the New Stalinism. Xi has been the paramount leader, Chinas highest-ranking political leader, since 2012. It was Chinese President Xi Jinpings series of key economic policy decisions over the past few years that brought a party-state back into the Chinese economy.
Chinese President Xi Jinpings political and ideological conclusions are that his emphasis on common prosperity for the reduction of income inequality, self-reliance to reach domestic technical self-sufficiency, and new development concept generally, which reinforces the Partys leadership role vis-a-vis the market, will set the stage for a decade of acceptable growth for the Chinese real economy, without endangering political control. In Xis case, he is keenly aware that the radical changes he has made in the general political environment of China has earned him formidable enemies waiting for the chance to challenge his political credibility -- or even supremacy inside China.
In doing so, Xi has resurrected Maoists popular lines in order to get the people to accept national goals established by the Chinese Communist Party, and eventually convince them that the party-state of Chinas Leninist ideology is both more democratic and better at serving them than any other political system. To do so, Xi has invoked a long list of Confucian axioms to justify the modernization of the systems and capabilities of national government through the institutionalization of a party-leadership system.56 His second narrative is focused on how the Chinese ancient sciences had proven the peoples Chinese heritage is equipped to prevail in the contemporary technology race.57 His third narrative is how China has always been a peaceful country.
Xis ideas can be seen as serving citizens as better tools for statecraft within the Chinese Communist Party, as opposed to separation of powers doctrines typical of Western legal systems. See Xi Jinpings New China Unveils the F 3 This strategys broad goals-- building a moderately prosperous society, deepening reforms, managing China according to the rule of law, and strengthening party discipline--have not received enough critical scholarly examination beyond Chinese mainland Marxist ideologues, but they should, because of the global implications of Chinas vast economic growth and the reach of its markets.
Chinese President Xi Jinpings, then, has a compelling interest in assuring as little disruption of Chinas economic growth, financial stability, and social welfare as possible by 2022. As long as the Chinese lockdown remains in place, the costs of the pandemic on the Chinese economy will continue to increase over time, and add to the political and economic headwinds facing Chinese President Xi in the run-up to the 20th Party Congress in November.
From post-Mao China through Xi, the Partys leaders argued that Chinas other nationalists had tried and failed to resuscitate it during the 20th century. As Communist ideology has played less central a role in mass life in the Peoples Republic of China, senior party political leaders like Xi have continued the rehabilitative work of ancient Chinese philosophical figures such as Hanfei, who are included alongside Confucianism in the mainstream of Chinese thought, and Xi considers both of these relevant.
Xi is first and foremost a Leninist, and prefers State-Owned Enterprises , a political and material foundation for Chinese socialism, to lead Chinas technical growth.51 This explains why the three-year state-owned enterprises plan sets no upper limits on SOEs purchasing private firms. As Xi himself told the Central Committee of the CCP in October 2020, State-owned enterprises are the essential material and political basis of socialism, which has Chinas characteristics, they are an essential pillar and a powerhouse of Chinese communist governance, a major force for Chinese communist governance, and they are a major political and economic engine of Chinas governance. Marxism-Leninism, by contrast, makes individuals the means to the achievement of collective ends.56 For Beijing, as for Xi Jinping, collective material prosperity rather than political freedom is the yardstick against which Beijing judges success.57 The comprehensive national power of the socialist state is an additional yardstick, consistent both with Marxism-Leninisms focus on collective rather than individual goals and with the ultimately nationalist project of the Chinese Revolution, whose original aspiration, as we have seen, was to make the people prosperous and the country strong and to rejuvenate the Chinese nation.